Organizational mortality events are better understood than the process by which organizations cease to be. Complementing research on organizing, we theorize about disorganizing. We propose that disorganizing organizations attempt to avoid mortality by reducing audience engagement. We also propose that, typically, such behaviors only delay the inevitable because reduced engagement diminishes audience appeal which, in turn, raises mortality hazards. Analyzing life histories of 1891 organizations that experience protracted mortality processes, we find support for our arguments. Reducing engagement increases the mortality hazard for venture capital firms by reducing the firm's appeal to co-investors, but gradual reductions attenuate the effects of reduced engagement on both mortality and appeal. We discuss implications of these findings for organizational theory, entrepreneurs, and institutional investors.
Introduction
How do organizations come and cease to be? These two questions have been key inquiries of organizational researchers since Hannan and Freeman's (1977) seminal paper on the population ecology of organizations. As a result, much is now known about organizational birth, change, and death: the origins of organizational founders (e.g. Freeman, 1986; Audia and Rider, 2005) , the rate of organizational entry into populations (e.g. Delacroix and Carroll, 1983; Hannan and Freeman, 1987; , the rate of organizational change (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1984;  conserving resources to deploy should their environment become more favorable to them .
Self-preservation comes at the price of an organization's actual appeal to audiences because appeal, or the attractiveness an organization's offerings to audience members, is increasing with engagement (Hannan et al., 2007: 181-183) . 1 Further, reduced engagement might itself draw increased scrutiny from audiences so that especially abrupt reductions in engagement hasten organizational decline. If so, then gradual reductions in engagement should extend the organization's life more than rapid reductions in engagement. We therefore propose that disorganizing organizations reduce audience engagement prior to experiencing mortality, that doing so diminishes their appeal, and furthermore, that gradual reductions in engagement are most likely to successfully preserve appeal and delay mortality. Four empirical implications of our theory are tested. First, mortality hazards are decreasing with both engagement and appeal. Second, reduced audience engagement increases the mortality hazard and diminishes the organization's appeal. Third, these effects are attenuated by the rate at which organizations reduce audience engagement. Fourth, engagement's effect on organizational mortality is mediated by its effect on appeal.
We illustrate support for our theory using data from the US venture capital industry, an organizational population in which disorganizing is a protracted process (Freeman, 2005) . Identifying mortality of venture capital firms is challenging but the industry offers an excellent opportunity to observe disorganizing processes over a time period much longer than that observed in most organizational populations. Even if a firm's leaders agree to disband, they are legally obligated to continue managing the firm's capital on behalf of investors until their investments are liquidated. Given the illiquid nature of the investments, this period can last several years. Thus, it is common for industry insiders to describe the end of many venture capital firms with phrases like "winding down" or "walking dead." These organizations do not transition abruptly from operational to inoperative but, rather, they fade away. We conclude with a discussion of practical implications of our inquiry for entrepreneurs and institutional investors and directions for future empirical research in other settings. environmental influences on the rate at which new organizations appear within existing populations. The extent to which environmental conditions make resources available for founding determines the rate at which entrepreneurs mobilize resources to found new organizations that enter populations.
Resource availability varies with the surrounding social structure (Stinchcombe, 1965; Delacroix and Carroll, 1983) , the extent to which existing organizations control resources (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Brittain and Freeman, 1980) , the extent to which the organizational form being founded is legitimate (Hannan and Freeman, 1987; McKendrick et al., 2003) , entrepreneurs' prior organizational experiences (Freeman, 1986; Audia and Rider, 2005) , and concurrent founding attempts (Lomi, 1995; Sorenson and Audia, 2000) . The ecological literature on organizational founding is reviewed so extensively elsewhere that further discussion is unwarranted (see Aldrich and Wiedenmayer, 1993; Carroll and Khessina, 2005) . Instead, we focus on recent studies of the pre-founding stage of the organizational life cycle that is often called "preproduction" but we refer to as "organizing."
Ecological work examines the rate at which new organizations are founded, but founding is an event that marks the transition from the entrepreneurial mobilization of resources to the organizational utilization of resources. For example, Carroll and Hannan (2000: 339) note that "organizing processes usually begin long before an organization's recognized founding date." Similarly, Lomi et al. (2010: 133) state that "preproduction processes introduce a temporal decoupling between organizational building decisions and organizational founding."
There are two primary justifications for studying the organizing process. First, doing so enriches our understanding of population dynamics (Carroll and Hannan, 2000; Carroll and Khessina, 2005; Lomi et al., 2005 Lomi et al., , 2010 . Not all organizing attempts result in actual founding events, as documented by studies of television stations (Sørensen and Sorenson, 2003) and medical schools (Ruef, 2004) . Consequently, conventional founding rate models may underestimate the true founding rate if many organizations fail before researchers identify them as operational.
Failed founding attempts may also partially account for irregularities in densitydependent selection. For example, simulations indicate that delays between founding decisions and actual entry may produce fluctuations in population density around levels predicted by density dependence theory (Lomi et al., 2010) . We believe that studying the disorganizing process will yield similarly valuable insights. For example, disorganizing organizations may compete less for population-specific resources than organizations conducting business-as-usual.
Second, clarification of organizing processes enables more direct connections to theories of organizations and entrepreneurship beyond ecology (Carroll and Khessina, 2005) . Because theories of entrepreneurship rarely motivate populationlevel predictions, it is uncommon for researchers to reconcile ecological insights with theories cast at more micro levels of analysis (cf. Aldrich and Wiedenmayer, 1993; Thornton, 1999; Audia and Rider, 2006) . But, a large body of work on organizational decline provides insights into the disorganizing process and its influence on ecological dynamics (e.g., Sutton and Callahan, 1987; Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1988; D'Aveni, 1989; Meyer and Zucker, 1989) . Complementing studies of organizing with studies of disorganizing should, therefore, enrich our understanding of population dynamics and also broaden the influence of organizational ecology.
Disorganizing, engagement, and organizational mortality
Successful organizing attempts are characterized by a transition from idea to organization. But, disorganizing attempts are not similarly characterized by a transition from organization to memory because processes of growth and decline are not symmetric. Growing and declining organizations of similar size differ in terms of important structural variables including differentiation, centralization, formalization, and administrative intensity, the ratio of supervisors to supervised workers (Freeman and Hannan, 1975) . For example, Freeman and Hannan (1975) argued that declining school districts exhibited greater administrative intensity than did growing districts of similar size because administrators who allocate resources tend to favor peers (i.e., other administrators) at the expense of other organizational members (e.g. teachers). Freeman (1979) also found that as revenues increased growing school districts added personnel in greater proportion than did declining school districts. These studies demonstrate how differences in growth and decline processes prompt distinct organizational behaviors, even in organizations of similar size.
Another important difference between growing and declining organizations is the nature of organizational politics. Effective management of conflict is viewed as essential to organizational growth (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990) . But, organizational decline induces resource scarcity and fosters internal conflicts that pit organizational members' interests against one another (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Boeker, 1992) . Although organizations can operate effectively despite such tensions, both internal and external parties are likely to scrutinize the organization for causes of decline (Selznick, 1949; March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963) . This scrutiny motivates our theorizing about disorganizing processes.
Extant research indicates that leaders of declining organizations will try to preserve the organization and their organizational positions. As organizations are infused with value beyond their functions they take on lives of their own and their members attend to survival even if survival necessitates adapting organizational goals (Selznick, 1949; Sills, 1957; Cyert and March, 1963) . For example, as Freeman and Hannan (1975) observed, organizational leaders often attempt to preserve the bureaucratic structure that provides them and their associates with employment.
A common organizational approach to self-preservation is simply to preserve the status quo (Staw et al., 1981; Audia et al., 2000) . By preserving the status quo, organizational leaders avoid exposing themselves to the scrutiny and criticism of powerful audiences. For example, Freeman (1979) found that school districts were less prone to enact policy change around election times. He reasoned that administrators are expected to persuasively justify change but also that the increased scrutiny of voters makes it more difficult for administrators to do so. Additionally, a study of organizational responses to the equal employment opportunity and affirmative action (EEO/AA) law observed that "organizations, rather than resist law overtly, are motivated by the weaknesses of EEO/AA law and the mechanics of the legal process to construct law in a manner that is minimally disruptive to the status quo" (Edelman, 1992 (Edelman, : 1535 . But, preserving the status quo is only one response to increased scrutiny; organizations might also try to deflect or avoid scrutiny entirely.
Generally, organizations are expected to perform reliably and to account rationally for failures to meet expectations (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . Failure to do so results in sanctions from key audiences, such as providers of resources and consumers of an organization's offerings (Hannan et al., 2007) . So, organizations face strong incentives to meet audience expectations and to preserve characteristics incumbent of their organizational form; otherwise, the organization's identity is compromised (Hsu and Hannan 2005; Hannan et al., 2006) .
Since organizations exercise greater control over their own behavior than they do over audience expectations, limiting the activities that audiences can observe is an effective way to avoid sanctions for counter-normative behaviors. As Hannan (2005: 60) states, "Once an audience attaches an identity to an organization, it presumes satisfaction of its expectations (or default codes) in the absence of evidence to the contrary."
Disorganizing organizations may, like other social actors seeking to avoid unfavorable evaluations, withdraw from their evaluators (Goffman, 1967; Tetlock and Boettger, 1994) . In this way, restricting audience members' abilities to scrutinize the organization can reduce the constraint of audience expectations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) . Repeated reductions may be necessary in order to escape scrutiny and the potential for sanctions. Therefore, we expect that the disorganizing process is characterized by a reduction in an organization's engagement of key audiences, as members try to avoid scrutiny, escape sanctions, and delay mortality.
Since engaging audiences depletes resources, organizations may also reduce engagement in an attempt to conserve scarce resources. Reducing engagement enables organizations to conserve resources in the form of organizational slack, that can support experimentation (Levinthal and March, 1981) , reduce interdependence among its parts (Galbraith, 1973) , and buffer them from failure (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988) . But, slack resources can only improve organizational performance if the organization survives long enough to deploy them (Singh, 1986; Sharfman et al., 1988) .
There is a tradeoff between deploying resources to engage organizational audiences and avoiding scrutiny. Since audiences attach greater appeal to organizations that engage them, reducing engagement diminishes appeal. Large reductions in engagement are more salient to audiences than small reductions, so questions about the focal organization's commitment to the audience become more likely the more engagement is reduced. The larger the increments by which engagement is reduced, then, the more likely it is that audiences will evaluate the organization negatively, thereby increasing the likelihood of organizational mortality. Our arguments suggest the following two predictions.
Hypothesis 1a: The greater an organization's audience engagement, the lower its mortality hazard. Hypothesis 1b: The more an organization reduces audience engagement, the greater its mortality hazard.
Our next prediction about the effects of engagement on organizational mortality concerns the rate at which organizations reduce audience engagement (i.e. rapid versus gradual). Hannan and Freeman (1984: 156-57) imply that fundamental organizational transformation rarely goes unnoticed by audiences. Largely because fundamental changes are readily observed by key audiences, they are disruptive and deleterious to organizational life chances (e.g. Carroll, 1984; Delacroix and Swaminathan, 1991; Haveman, 1992; Greve, 1999; Dowell and Swaminathan, 2000) . But audiences do not necessarily take notice of all organizational changes. Many organizations maintain features that conform to audiences' expectations while subtly changing other aspects of their operations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) .
If disorganizing organizations reduce audience engagement in order to delay or avoid mortality, then the effectiveness of this strategy will at least partially depend upon the extent to which key audiences observe the reduction. Consistent with prior work (Hsu et al., 2011; Negro et al., 2011) , we assume that rapid reductions (e.g. abrupt withdrawal) are more likely to be noticed than are gradual reductions in engagement (e.g. a series of nominal reductions). Based on this assumption, gradually reducing audience engagement should enable organizations to maintain an appearance of conformity while constraining key audience members' abilities to scrutinize the organization in its disorganizing state. In some cases, the reduction may be so gradual so as to be imperceptible. If reducing the level of audience engagement enables an organization to preserve its identity, at least temporarily, then gradual reductions in audience engagement should delay mortality more than rapid reductions.
Hypothesis 1c: Holding the magnitude of reduction constant, the more gradually an organization reduces engagement the lesser that reduced engagement increases the mortality hazard.
Engagement and appeal
While organizations reduce engagement in an attempt to conserve resources or avoid scrutiny, they simultaneously alter their actual appeal to audiences. Hannan et al. Mortality in the venture capital industry (2007: 182) postulate that "the expected actual appeal of an offering normally increases with . . . the engagement at the position". Reduced engagement is thus likely to diminish an organization's expected actual appeal to many audience members. Previous research has shown that organizations that reduce engagement with specific audience members become less appealing to those audience members (Hsu et al., 2009; Negro et al., 2010) . Because engagement reflects organizational effort to enhance the appeal of their offerings to key audiences, larger reductions in engagement are likely to result in greater losses of appeal.
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Hypothesis 2a: The greater an organization's audience engagement, the greater its appeal. Hypothesis 2b: The more an organization reduces audience engagement, the lower its appeal.
As we argued earlier, gradual reductions in engagement by an organization are likely to be less salient to audiences than rapid reductions in engagement. Consequently, audiences will be less likely to perceive decline when an organization gradually reduces engagement than when engagement is reduced rapidly. Therefore, our argument implies that the more gradually engagement is reduced the less an organization's actual appeal is diminished. This suggests that gradual reductions in engagement attenuate the main effect of reducing engagement on appeal.
Hypothesis 2c: Holding the magnitude of reduction constant, the more gradually an organization reduces engagement the lesser that reduced engagement diminishes its appeal.
Engagement, appeal, and organizational mortality
Diminished appeal may, thus, account partially for the relationship between reduced engagement and mortality. It represents a demand side consequence of our supply side argument that organizations reduce audience engagement to avoid scrutiny and/ or to conserve resources. It is plausible that as an organization reduces its audience engagement, audience members will find interactions with the organization less appealing. This logic implies an endogenous process of mutual withdrawal in which organizations reduce engagement, audience members find the organization less appealing, organizations and audiences interact less, and so on. The upshot is that appeal probably mediates, at least partially, the relationship between engagement and organizational mortality. Organizations that lower their mortality hazard by gradually reducing engagement probably preserve more of their appeal than organizations that rapidly reduce engagement. If our arguments are correct, then appeal 2 Empirically testing the engagement-appeal relationship is necessary for our mediation test and for validating the applicability of the theory proposed by Hannan et al. (2007). enhances survival chances and also mediates the relationship between engagement and mortality.
Hypothesis 3a: The greater an organization's appeal, the lower its mortality hazard. Hypothesis 3b: The relationship between engagement and organizational mortality is mediated by appeal: engagement reduces the mortality hazard; engagement increases appeal; and appeal reduces the mortality hazard.
To summarize, our argument is that both engagement and appeal enhance survival chances. Reductions in engagement increase mortality hazards, largely by reducing appeal. But, gradual reductions in engagement are more likely to preserve appeal and delay mortality than rapid reductions.
Empirical analysis

The venture capital industry
Venture capital firms raise capital from investors for the purposes of making equity investments in private companies. Capital is raised periodically in the form of a "fund" that is structured so that the venture capitalists are general partners and the fund's investors are limited partners. General partners are what most people would recognize as "venture capitalists." Limited partners include institutional investors such as pension funds, university endowments, foundations, banks, and insurance companies as well as wealthy individuals. Limited partners invest regularly as general partners bring new fund offerings to market.
Fundraising occurs when limited partners commit a specific amount of capital to a general partnership's fund. This committed capital is disbursed to the general partners only when investments are made; general partners do not hold capital. Satisfying the concerns of potential limited partners necessitates high levels of engagement by general partners and, occasionally, the involvement of fundraising intermediaries in order to overcome information asymmetries and facilitate investments (Rider, 2009) .
Limited partners evaluate fund offerings based on a general partnership's perceived potential to generate attractive returns on investments. For each fund, limited partners and general partners negotiate the terms of the partnership, including the life of the fund (typically 10 years), the management fees charged (typically 2% of committed capital on an annual basis) and the distribution of profits on investments (typically 20% for general partners and 80% for limited partners). A fund's investment strategy is normally based on the fund size (e.g. a $500M fund), the firm's industry focus (e.g. software, life sciences, energy), and the number of general partners in the fund.
After capital commitments are secured, general partners identify new companies for investment and then draw upon limited partners' committed capital over an Mortality in the venture capital industry agreed-upon period as investments are made. Capital committed to a fund by limited partners may only be invested by that particular fund; partnership agreements generally prohibit general partners from transferring capital between the firm's funds (e.g. Fund III to Fund IV). There are also strong industry norms against portfolio companies receiving capital from multiple firm funds. These agreements and normative expectations strongly restrict general partners' abilities to transfer capital between investment vehicles.
Identification of promising investment opportunities requires a high level of audience engagement by general partners. They attend industry events, consider entrepreneurs' funding requests, speak with other investors to learn of opportunities, and conduct due diligence on prospective investments. Once a substantial portion of a fund's committed capital has been invested in portfolio companies, the firm usually raises a subsequent fund for future investment purposes, usually every 3-5 years.
Venture capital firms, then, engage several key audience members, the most important of which are companies seeking investments and other venture capital firms seeking co-investors. Engaging these audience members entails identifying startup companies for investment, structuring syndicates with other venture capital investors, and managing a portfolio of investments. According to our arguments, venture capital firms that are disorganizing may disengage portfolio companies and co-investors by reducing their investment activities. Figure 1 illustrates variation among venture capital firms in terms of their audience engagement. The vast majority of venture capital firms actively engage key audiences within a given year, investing in new companies or investing additional capital in companies already in the firm's portfolio. Yet, a substantial portion of firms are not investing at all within a given year or, in our terms, reducing their level of engagement with product market audiences. Last, each year a small portion of this group also appears to be "exiting" or, in our terms, experiencing mortality. These firms are managing their last fund and have not made any initial investments in companies within the past 3 years.
There are several ways to characterize a venture capital firm's audience engagement. We treat a firm's level of investment activity as a measure of audience engagement and also demonstrate why the primary alternative indicator, a firm's centrality in the industry co-investment network, is an inferior substitute. Specific variables are described below.
Sample
We identified all venture capital firms that operated in the United States between 1980 and 2006 using the 2007 Thomson Financial VentureXpert database ("VentureXpert"), which is described extensively in several published papers (e.g. Podolny, 2001; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Hochberg et al., 2007; Rider, 2010 Alternatives, 2006) . From these data, we constructed our sample and variables.
Defining mortality
Defining organizational mortality is often challenging because numerous events may be associated with an organization's end (e.g. disbanding, merger, acquisition, bankruptcy, government takeover). For example, in an automobile industry study, Hannan et al. (1998) identify seven different categories of mortality events in addition to an "unknown" category. A common analytical approach is to treat an organization as experiencing a mortality event when the organization is delisted from an industry directory (e.g. Barnett, 1990; Carroll and Hannan, 2000; Sorenson and Audia, 2000) . But, some venture capital organizations continue to be listed in industry directories long after they cease making investments. For example, of the 1256 venture capital firms listed in the VentureXpert database in 2006 over 300 had made no new investments in startup companies in 2004, 2005, or 2006 and had also gone 5 years without raising a fund. This illustrates an aspect of the venture capital industry that may seem atypical of organizations but is also observed in other organizational populations including shipbuilders, schools and energy producers: mortality is a protracted process. In a paper on the proliferation of the venture capital organizational form, Freeman (2005: 158) describes the process by which venture capital firms cease to be:
Venture capital firms rarely disband suddenly. Rather, they die a lingering death. Generally, the end of a firm is signaled when it fails to raise another fund. This may happen because of poor performance, or because economic times have gotten more difficult, or simply because the general partners decide to pursue other interests and opportunities. After it becomes clear that there will not be another fund, people still come to work. The phones are answered. Portfolio companies that have received funding are still supported with various services. As long as there are assets to be managed, the funds raised by that venture capital firm still impose duties on the venture capitalists. They will keep their offices going so long as the workload requires a place of business. On the other hand, venture capitalists peel off when their firm falls on hard times. As the prospect of substantial carried interest dissipates, they simply spend less time at the venture firm.
Audience members may infer that a venture capital firm ceases to be once it stops making investments and goes an abnormally long period between fundraising events (e.g.45 years). But, Freeman's narrative indicates that the firm ceases to conduct the business that defines its form long before audiences arrive at this inference. Industry insiders are well aware of this fact. For example, venture capital firms that cease to make new investments in portfolio companies are commonly said to be "winding down." That is, the firm continues to support companies in its investment portfolio (general partners are legally obligated to do so) but the firm's general partners no longer source new deals and also do not solicit additional capital from institutional investors. For the most part, the organization is merely a legal entity and no longer a collective actor that continues to pursue specific goals for an unlimited duration (Hannan, 2005) . In such cases, mortality is inevitable. But, mortality may be delayed.
Importantly, reduced audience engagement does not always lead to mortality events. It is also common for venture capital firms to reduce their investment activity in order to conserve investors' capital commitments for follow-on investments in companies currently within their portfolio. Industry insiders often refer to this practice as keeping "dry powder." It is also common for venture capital firms to reduce investment activity when they believe that market valuations of startup companies are too high. Some firms "sit on the sidelines" in the hopes that market conditions will become more favorable for them. So, in this setting, it is not a foregone conclusion that reduced audience engagement precedes mortality.
Generally, organizational mortality may be a protracted process due to legal requirements, sunk costs, asset-specific investments, or high exit costs (Dixit, 1992; Lomi et al., 2005) . For venture capital firms, mortality is delayed by legal obligations of the firm's general partners to its limited partners as well as the illiquid nature of venture capital investments. Although this delay presents an empirical challenge to researchers it also presents a theoretical opportunity. If a reasonable approach to identifying venture capital firm mortality is developed, then one can observe disorganizing behavior over a longer period of time than is typical for most populations. Therefore, the venture capital industry is an excellent setting for testing our arguments about disorganizing.
Outcomes and estimation
We analyze two organizational outcomes as functions of audience engagement: (i) mortality and (ii) appeal. In both analyses, the unit of analysis is the firm-year. There are 16,173 firm-years for the 1891 firms in our full sample. Between 1983 and 2006, we observe 968 firm mortality events; 923 firms are right-censored (i.e. these firms continue to operate in 2006). So, one inferential advantage of the setting is its high mortality rate (51%).
Dependent variable
We define an organizational mortality event as occurring when a venture capital firm ceases to operate according to the blueprint of the venture capital organizational form. Specifically, venture capital firms raise capital from institutional investors in order to make equity investments in new companies. Figure 2 demonstrates that the vast majority of firms (71% of firm-years) raise a fund within 3 years of their last fund closing. Yet, many firms go much longer between funds. For example, $13.5% of the firm-years in our sample have not raised a fund in the past 5 years. Figure 1 indicates that in any given year $60-80% of all US venture capital firms in our Mortality in the venture capital industry sample invest in a new portfolio company in a given year. So, these conditions are reasonable.
For us to declare a mortality event, a firm must meet two conditions. Our first condition for declaring mortality is that a firm must go three consecutive years without making an investment in a new portfolio company. To avoid prematurely declaring mortality, the firm must also not make such an investment in the next 2 years. Our second condition is that a firm must cease raising capital for investment purposes. Specifically, a firm must go 5 years without raising a fund and must also not raise a later fund during our observation period. If a new investment is made or if a new fund is raised then we reset the firm's mortality clock and re-apply our conditions.
In summary, to experience mortality a firm must have raised its last fund and must also go five consecutive years without investing in a new company. To be clear, we declare mortality for some firms that continue to invest in firms in its current portfolio but do not make initial investments in new companies. Figure 1 illustrates that we declare $1-11% of all US venture capital firms to be "exiting" in a given year. Industry insiders might say that these firms are "winding down" or "fading away."
We believe this to be a conservative definition of mortality. But, in supplementary analyses we experimented with more and less conservative definitions of mortality and found results to be very similar to those reported here in terms of statistical significance and effect magnitude. Moreover, our definition has face validity with industry insiders. For example, OVP Venture Partners (2007) identified firms that had been "shaken out" of the industry. They declared firms that went one calendar year without investing in a new company to be "playing out the cards in their hand" and "no longer in the game" (OVP Venture Partners, 2007) .
We first estimate the instantaneous hazard rate of organizational mortality. Because organizational age exerts complex effects on firm mortality rates (Carroll and Hannan, 2000) and we do not theorize about age, we estimated piecewise exponential hazard rate models with age interval indicator variables ("pieces") rather than a single age measure (and/or its squared term). The age pieces are defined by the following organizational age intervals: 0-5 years, 6-8 years, 9-11 years, 12-14 years, and !15 years. To avoid misspecification of the age-mortality relationship we experimented with altering the number of age intervals as well as the interval definitions; the results reported here are robust to either increasing or decreasing the number of intervals and/or the ages that delineate intervals. Firm age is the difference between the focal year and a firm's founding year, plus one. Founding years were obtained from the VentureXpert database or the Greyhouse or Galante directories. If founding year was unavailable in all three sources, then the year of the firm's first recorded private equity investment in the VentureXpert database was used to calculate age.
We then estimate zero-inflated negative binomial regression models to proxy for a firm's audience appeal. In these models, the dependent variable is the count of co-investors in the largest syndicate that includes the focal firm in the focal year, minus the focal firm. This measure accounts for the extent to which the firm appeals to potential partners as a co-investor; the more co-investors, the greater the firm's appeal. 3 We assume that "free riding" incentives discourage firms from allowing unappealing co-investors to participate in large syndicates. The data include some firm-years in which firms either do not invest or do not co-invest with other firms. In such cases, the dependent variable equals zero. We use a logit inflation model to account for these years. Our inflation variable is the firm's Bonacich centrality in the industry co-investment network (described below). More central firms, by the network definition, are less likely to be inactive or invest solo in a given year than are peripheral firms. The negative binomial model accounts for a firm's appeal to co-investors, measured as the largest syndicate in which the firm participates in the focal year.
Independent variables
We construct four, firm-level independent variables: (i) audience engagement, (ii) reduced engagement, (iii) years since maximum engagement, and (iv) firm appeal. Appeal is the dependent variable in the appeal analyses and an independent variable in the mortality analyses. The other three variables are described below.
To measure a firm's audience engagement, we assumed that the more visible a firm is to industry insiders the greater is its audience engagement. Organizational prominence is perhaps the most widely-used measure of its visibility in a social system (Knoke and Burt, 1983; Roberts et al., 2011) . We assume that a venture capital firm is prominent to the extent that the firm is actively investing in portfolio companies. We, therefore, measure engagement as the number of equity investments that the firm made in private companies in the prior year. Note that investments include both initial investments in companies and follow-on investments in companies already within the firm's investment portfolio, whereas our dependent variable counts only initial investments.
To measure reductions in audience engagement, we computed for each firm-year the difference between a firm's maximum number of investments the firm made in any year since its founding (or 1980 if founded prior to 1980) up to the focal year minus the number of investments the firm made in the focal year. The greater this reduced-investment-activity variable, the more a firm has reduced audience engagement. We also computed a variable which is the number of years since the year in 3 Note that we do not model the count of a firm's unique co-investors within the focal year because this count is so highly correlated with the number of investments made in the focal year that the variables are almost indistinguishable.
Mortality in the venture capital industry which the focal firm made its maximum-to-date number of investments. This clock variable essentially captures the rate at which the firm reduced audience engagement. Both of these variables equal zero in the year when the firm makes its maximum number of investments to-date.
In the mortality analysis, Hypothesis 1a is supported by a negative coefficient on the engagement variable; Hypothesis 1b is supported by a positive coefficient on the reduction variable; and Hypothesis 1c is supported by a negative coefficient on the interaction term created by multiplying the reduction variable and the clock variable. In the appeal analysis, Hypothesis 2a is supported by a positive coefficient on the engagement variable; Hypothesis 2b is supported by a negative coefficient on the reduction variable; and Hypothesis 2c is supported by a positive coefficient on the interaction term created by multiplying the reduction variable and the clock variable. Hypothesis 3a is supported by a negative coefficient on the appeal variable in the mortality models. Hypothesis 3b is supported by a positive coefficient on the engagement variable in the appeal models, a negative coefficient on the appeal variable in the mortality models, and a significant z-test statistic in a mediation test (Sobel, 1982; Baron and Kenny, 1986 ).
Control variables
Several control variables are also included in our models of firm mortality. One is the number of funds each firm raised since founding; one was added to this count and then the sum was transformed by its natural log to desensitize the measure to a long right tail distribution. This variable is updated each year to account for organizational experience in factor markets; firms that raised more funds in the past possess more experience in factor markets. Our measure of organizational experience is the total number of equity investments a firm has made in private companies since founding (or 1980 if founded prior to 1980). This control variable starts at zero and is updated every firm-year after founding.
To control for a firm's access to industry deals, we used network analysis techniques to characterize each firm's centrality in the venture capital industry co-investment network for each year. We constructed a symmetric firm-by-firm matrix of all investments in private US companies between 1980 and 2006. Each cell in the matrix takes a value of 1 if firms i and j both made an investment in the same company in the previous 3 years and a value of 0 if the firms did not. The matrix is updated annually so that, for example, the network measures for 2006 are based on deals done in 2003, 2004, and 2005 . The 3-year window strikes a compromise between prior studies that use the VentureXpert data to construct co-investment networks using 1-year (e.g., Podolny, 2001) or 5-year investment windows (e.g. Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Rider, 2009) . 4 Note that we also used this network to compute our dependent variable for the appeal analyses (i.e. maximum syndicate size by firm-year). Following prior studies (Podolny, 2001 ), we computed each firm's Bonacich centrality in the co-investment network as follows (Bonacich, 1987) :
where is a scaling factor that normalizes the measure by the mean value of {AE k R kþ1 1} in a given year, is a weighting factor that like prior research in this area (Podolny, 2001; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001 ) is equal to g of the maximum eigenvalue in the firm-by-firm co-investment matrix R in which cell ij equals 1 if firm i and firm j invested in the same company in the previous 5 years, and 0 otherwise, and 1 represents a column vector of ones. By this measure, the most central firms are those that invest with other central firms because each firm's centrality is a weighted measure of its co-investors' centrality scores.
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Investment performance is likely to reduce a firm's mortality hazard. We account for firm-level investment success by including two control variables that are typically used to characterize venture capital firm performance (e.g. Hochberg et al., 2007) . The first is the number of companies in the firm's investment portfolio that went public in the prior year and the second is the number of companies that experienced another type of liquidity event in the prior year (e.g. acquisition). Generally, the more initial public offerings or other liquidity events the more successful the venture capital firm and initial public offerings are typically more successful than mergers or acquisitions.
We also coded two indicator variables to identify firms headquartered in California or Massachusetts because the US venture capital industry is concentrated in these two states. For example, almost 40% of firm-years in our sample are from firms based in one of these two states. Relative to firms located elsewhere, firms headquartered in agglomerations may either survive at higher rates during periods of intense competition by drawing upon local resources (e.g. Audia and Rider, 2010) or fail at higher rates due to fierce competition from local rivals (e.g. Sorenson and Audia, 2000) . We identified the main office of each firm in VentureXpert or in the Greyhouse or Galante directories and coded these state indicator variables as 1 if the firm's main office was located in California or Massachusetts, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 5 Since our data prevent us from measuring Bonacich centrality prior to 1983 or investment experience prior to 1980 it is possible that some firms were more central in earlier co-investment networks or accumulated substantial experience prior to our period of observation. To account for this, in models not reported here we included a left-censored variable (i.e. network centrality is left-censored) for all firms founded prior to 1980. Results were very similar to those reported here and the key results were insensitive to the inclusion of this variable.
Mortality in the venture capital industry
Some firms invest in a single industry category while others invest more generally across many industries. Since firm-level survival chances may vary based on how specific or general their appeal is to product market audiences (Carroll, 1985) , we account for specialist and generalist firm investment strategies. For each firm-year, we computed a measure of specialism based on the industry categories in which each firm invest. The measure was constructed as follows:
where p i represents the proportion of firm i's total number of investments in the prior year that were made in each of the following nine industry categories listed in the VentureXpert database: biotechnology, communications, computer hardware, computer software, consumer products, energy, healthcare and pharmaceuticals, industrial products, and other unclassified. The measure has a minimum value of nearly zero for a firm that invests identical proportions in each of the nine categories and a maximum value of one for a firm that makes 100% of its investments in one category.
In the appeal analyses, we also included a variable that is the difference between the year in which a firm last raised a fund and the focal firm-year. This variable is one of the components of organizational mortality so it is not included in the mortality analyses. But, it is included in these models to account for a firm's stock of resources (i.e. capital). Finally, we also included year fixed effects in all models to account for industry conditions in the focal year that are common to all venture capital firms in the sample (e.g. entry, competition, stock market performance). Note that given the industry's cyclical nature (Figure 1 ), year fixed effects are strongly preferred to a time trend or analysis clock variable.
Results
Table 1 displays summary statistics and correlations for all variables included in the mortality and appeal analyses. Table 2 presents the results of our piecewise exponential models of US venture capital firm mortality. Model 1 provides a baseline model with control variables only. The mortality hazard decreases with the number of funds raised, the firm's investment specialization by industry, the number of recent initial public offerings and other liquidity events, and centrality in the venture capital co-investment network. Additionally, firms in California are less likely to experience mortality than firms headquartered elsewhere and the risk of mortality increases with cumulative investment experience, age held roughly constant. These effects are generally consistent across all models displayed in Table 2 .
Model 2 includes our first measure of audience engagement, the number of investments the firm made in the prior year. As indicated by the negative and significant coefficient on the engagement variable, the greater a firm's engagement the Mortality in the venture capital industry All models include year fixed effects. Robust SEs clustered at the firm level.
*P50.05; **P50.01; y P50.10; two-tailed tests.
lower its mortality hazard. This supports Hypothesis 1a. Also, when we account for a firm's investment activity the effect of its network centrality is no longer statistically significant, suggesting that mortality is more sensitive to our activity measure of prominence (i.e. investments) than a structural measure (i.e. centrality). In Model 3, we account for the magnitude of a firm's reduction in audience engagement, measured as the decline in a firm's investment activity from its prior maximum. Supporting Hypothesis 1b, the more a firm reduces its engagement the greater mortality hazard. In Model 4, we include the main effect of years since the firm was most engaged. This effect is positive and statistically significant indicating that the mortality hazard increases the longer a firm has been reducing audience engagement. In Model 5, we include the interaction term of reduced-engagement and years-since-maximumengagement to test our argument regarding rapid versus gradual reductions in audience engagement. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term supports Hypothesis 1c. Holding the magnitude of reduction constant, gradual reductions in audience engagement delay mortality more rapid reductions do. Figure 3 depicts changes in the mortality hazard associated with reductions in audience engagement based on the coefficients in Model 5 of Table 2 . The baseline hazard is set to one when the key independent variables equal zero. At the mean, a 1 SD greater reduction in engagement (from 4.6 to 13.9 investments in the prior year) increases the mortality hazard by $15%. In marginal terms, at the mean level of reduced investment activity a one additional investment decrease raises a firm's mortality hazard by $1.2%. 
Figure 3
Multiplier of mortality rate, rapid versus gradual reduction in audience engagement.
Mortality in the venture capital industry
The moderating effect of the reduction rate on the mortality hazard may also be inferred from Figure 3 . Clearly, the more gradually a firm reduces its audience engagement the more mortality is delayed. At all levels of reduced engagement, the mortality hazard is lower for more gradual reductions in engagement than for more rapid reductions. We infer that the more an organization reduces its engagement of key audiences the greater is its mortality hazard but also that gradually reducing engagement attenuates this effect.
We now turn to analyses of appeal. Descriptive statistics for all variables are also presented in Table 2 and results from the zero-inflated negative binomial regressions are presented in Table 3 . Again, the dependent variable in these analyses is the size of the largest co-investment syndicate involving the focal firm in the focal year (i.e. a count of all co-investors, by company-round, minus the focal firm). Our identification assumption is that the larger the syndicate in which a firm participates in a given year, the greater is the firm's audience appeal.
Model 1 presents results from a controls-only specification. Appeal, or maximum syndicate size, is increasing with the number of funds raised by the focal firm, the number of IPOs and other liquidity events experienced by the firm in the prior year, firm specialism by industry, location in California, and centrality in the co-investment network. Appeal is decreasing with a firm's cumulative investment experience. And the likelihood that a firm does not participate in a co-investment syndicate within a given year (i.e. a zero count) is decreasing with the firm's network centrality: more peripheral firms tend to produce excess zeros in the data. These results are fairly consistent across the four models.
Model 2 includes the main effect of engagement. Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, the greater a firm's audience engagement the larger the investment syndicate in which it participates: engagement enhances appeal. Model 3 includes the reduction in engagement variable. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, reduced engagement diminishes appeal. In Model 4, we include the reduction rate variable, which is the number of years since a firm's peak investment level. The main effect of this variable is not statistically significant. In Model 5, we include the interaction term involving the magnitude of reduced engagement and the rate of reduction. Consistent with Hypothesis 2c, the reduction rate attenuates the negative effect of reduced engagement on firm appeal. In other words, audience engagement enhances appeal and reduced engagement diminishes appeal but gradual reductions preserve more appeal than rapid reductions do.
The moderating effects of the reduction rate on reduced audience engagement are depicted in Figure 4 . Specifically, this graph depicts the multiplier of predicted syndicate size associated with reduced investment activity at three different reduction rates: the mean rate, the mean rate plus 1 SD, and the mean rate minus 1 SD. At the mean, a 1 SD larger decline in engagement (from a 4.6 to a 13.9 reduction in investments in the prior year) decreases appeal by $2.7%. Figure 4 Mortality in the venture capital industry that the more gradually a firm reduces its audience engagement the less its appeal is diminished. These results are consistent with our argument that organizations reduce engagement to avoid but that appeal suffers as a result. We now consider the relationship between engagement, appeal, and mortality. Table 4 presents tests of our mediation argument. To facilitate comparisons of coefficients, Model 5 of Table 4 reproduces  Model 5 of Table 2 . When we include the appeal variable in Model 6 of the mortality analysis we see that, consistent with Hypothesis 3a, the greater an organization's appeal the lower is its mortality hazard. A mediation relationship is present if engagement significantly influences both the mortality hazard and appeal, if appeal influences the mortality hazard, and the z-test statistic for a mediation relationship is significant. To compute a z-test statistic for a mediation effect, we re-estimated Model 6 of Table 4 and Model 5 of Table 3 using ordinary least squares regressions because a z-test statistic is valid only for linear models. Consistent with Hypothesis 3b, the z-test statistic for these models is À7.33.
also indicates
6 This indicates that appeal partially mediates the empirical relationship between engagement and mortality. Based on these results, we conclude that declining organizations reduce audience engagement to delay mortality but that doing so reduces the organization's appeal to All models include year fixed effects. Robust SEs clustered at the firm level.
6
Results of these models are available upon request. The theorized effects were statistically significant and in the direction predicted by the hypotheses. key audiences; the more gradually an organization reduces audience engagement the longer mortality is delayed by preserving appeal.
Discussion
Ecological research informs our understanding of why organizations come and go, but how they do so is not nearly as well understood. Complementing recent work on preproduction, or organizing processes, we studied the disorganizing process of the organizational life cycle. We framed our inquiry with early ecological work on organizational growth and decline (Freeman and Hannan, 1975; Freeman, 1979) and structural constraints on change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . Our basic argument is that declining organizations attempt to delay mortality because organizational members, and their supporters, hold vested interests in the organization's survival. Consequently, the disorganizing process is characterized by self-preservation efforts and, specifically, reduced engagement of key organizational audiences. Importantly, we focused on characteristic behaviors of organizations facing mortality. The venture capital industry, in which mortality is a protracted process, provided us with unusual insights into the disorganizing process. We built upon the growing literature on organizations and their audiences to test arguments about the relationships between engagement, appeal, and mortality. We found that disorganizing organizations tend to reduce their engagement of key audience members and that the greater the magnitude of the reduction the greater was their risk of experiencing mortality in a given year. Seemingly, organizational members' attempts to avoid audience scrutiny or to conserve resources actually accelerate the 
Figure 4
Multiplier of appeal, rapid versus gradual reduction in audience engagement.
Mortality in the venture capital industry organization's demise, by diminishing the organization's appeal to audiences. But, we also found that gradual reductions in engagement delayed mortality more than rapid reductions in engagement. We reasoned that gradual reductions in engagement preserve more of an organization's appeal to audience members than do rapid reductions, but that these self-preservation efforts merely delay the inevitable. These organizations fade away slowly but their mortality is largely unavoidable. Our arguments are consistent with classic work in organization theory that emphasizes survival as a primary organizational objective and details the great lengths that organizations will go to avoid mortality (Selznick, 1949; March and Simon, 1958) . This study is also consistent with the arguments of Meyer and Rowan (1977) , who posited that organizations often decouple structures from activities in order to maintain legitimacy, access resources, and enhance their survival prospects. They proposed that logics of confidence and good faith enable decoupling organizations to avoid inspection and evaluation by key audiences. Similarly, we proposed that declining organizations reduce audience engagement to avoid scrutiny and accountability. But, our study also implies that organizations can run but they cannot hide from audiences. Organizations must engage audiences to remain operational (e.g. secure resources, exchange goods, and services); their appeal is compromised by reductions in audience engagement. Consequently, self-preservation efforts are largely self-defeating.
Our study also offers theoretical and practical insights regarding entrepreneurship. Many new organizations fail (Stinchcombe, 1965; . While fashionable to attribute high failure rates to the behavioral biases of entrepreneurs (e.g. March and Shapira, 1987; Camerer and Lovallo, 1999) , the ecological approach emphasizes environmental factors that condition organizational failure rates (e.g. Aldrich and Weidenmayer, 1993; Thornton, 1999; Carroll and Khessina, 2005) . If environments present inaccurate signals about resource availability to entrepreneurs, then failure rates may be attributable to noisy environments as much as they are to behavioral biases.
Consider that in any given year a fairly large percentage of venture capital firms in our sample (between 22% and 64%) are either not making new investments, not making any new investments, or have not made any new investments in the past 2 years (Figure 1) . Put another way, of the 1256 venture capital firms listed in the VentureXpert database in 2006 over 300 had gone 5 years without raising a fund and also made no new investments in startup companies in 2004, 2005, or 2006 . Of course, publishers make claims of comprehensiveness to target customers and so they probably err on the side of inclusion when identifying venture capital firms for industry directories. But, this practice could lead entrepreneurs to develop overly optimistic assessments of venture capital availability and their chances of securing it.
Institutional investors might draw inferences similar to those drawn by nascent entrepreneurs. Industry directories present many more investment vehicles to diversify an institution's exposure to the venture capital asset class than the industry Mortality in the venture capital industry actually offers. Furthermore, the comparison of funds raised by the 968 firms in our sample that experience mortality and 923 surviving (right-censored firms) in Figure 5 illustrates that a large percentage of venture capital firms raise only one fund. So, even those that are making new investments may not be investing for very long. As a result, entrepreneurs and institutional investors might mistakenly infer that the market for venture capital is more munificent than it actually is at any point in time.
Importantly, these insights for organization theory and entrepreneurship are obtained by characterizing mortality as not merely an organizational event but also a process. Much like entrepreneurs organize prior to founding organizational members disorganize prior to disbanding. Future research that incorporates behavioral accounts of organizing and disorganizing is likely to provide additional valuable insights to researchers.
Conclusion
We sincerely hope that John Freeman's influence on this study is obvious to readers. After all, the idea to study mortality in the venture capital industry was originally his. We organized the study around John's scholarly and professional interests in ecology, organizational decline, venture capital, and entrepreneurship. general: the challenges of securing resources, managing growth, and coping with decline; political influences on individual and organizational behavior; tensions among groups of organizational members; disagreements about how to allocate resources and rewards; and seemingly suboptimal decisions to discontinue otherwise high-performing organizations. As John once wrote, "Foolishness and rational choice exist side by side in every organization. It is easy to theorize about one while ignoring the other. The challenge is to reconcile them." (Freeman, 1999: 164) . Hopefully, our reconciliation meets John's standard for organizational research. Our study indicates that attempts to avoid mortality by reducing audience engagement are unlikely to be successful. At best, organizations may hope to delay the inevitable. But, declining organizations attempt to avoid mortality anyway. Their likelihood of succeeding is not the point, though. The point is that organizational members want to succeed. John once claimed that organizations are "subject to daily dissolution" and that "organizations must renew themselves" each day (Freeman, 1986: 39) . As John's examples of bottle factory workers, soldiers, and egg farmers demonstrated to so many over the years, members attempt to preserve organizations because otherwise the organization and their role in it will cease to be. And because organizations inspire these efforts, such behaviors are best understood within an organizational context.
